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Jonathan Quong endorses a strict proportionality criterion for justified self-defense, that 
is, one that is harsh on the defender, not on the aggressor. He invites us to assume that an 
aggressor, Albert, is only going to break your finger, and you kill him in defense of your 
finger. And Quong says: “Albert, I hope you will agree, is not liable to this level of 
defensive harm.”1 It is unclear, however, why Quong hopes that. One would assume that 
he hopes it because he thinks that it is true that Albert is not liable to this level of 
defensive harm. Yet does he have an argument for this? Let us see.  
Quong thinks that proportionality is internal to liability to defensive force, so that one 
can only be liable to proportionate force and so it cannot be that force to which one is 
liable is disproportionate.2 (That one is liable to some force means that one would not be 
wronged, one’s rights would not be violated, by the infliction of such force.) I reject this 
assumption, but we can set it aside here, not least since Quong’s “stringency principle,” 
which is central for his account of proportionality, is actually formulated without any 
reference to liability. 
The Stringency Principle (General): If a wrongful attacker threatens to violate a 
right with stringency level X, then the level of defensive force it is proportionate to 
impose on the attacker is equivalent to X.3 
“Force” is used “as a metric that combines the variables of moral status, degree of 
harm, and mode of agency.”4 By “moral status” Quong means something like, for 
instance, “our moral status as free and equal participants in the democratic process,”5 
“harm” refers to such things as loss of property or bodily injuries,6 and “mode of agency” 
refers, for instance, to the distinction between eliminative and opportunistic harming, or 
(this is not the same distinction as the previous one,7 but we need not belabor this point) 
between harming someone as a side-effect of one’s course of action (for example, 
harming someone by diverting a runaway trolley away from five people, foreseeing, but 
not intending, that it will then kill another person) and harming someone as a means to an 
end (pushing one person in front of the trolley in order to stop it and save the other five).8 
Finally, the “stringency of a right … refers to the strength or weight of the right-holder’s 
claim. … For example, it might be permissible to infringe [that is, justifiably transgress] 
                                                
1 Jonathan Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 43(2) (2015), pp. 144-173, at 144. 
2 Ibid., esp. at 144-145. 
3 Ibid., p. 166. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 159. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Victor Tadros, “Wrongful Intention without Closeness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
43(1) (2015), pp. 52-74, at 64, shares this assessment. 
8 Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” p. 160. 
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right R1 only if we could, at a minimum, save one innocent person from having his legs 
broken. But it might be permissible to infringe right R2 only if we could, at a minimum, 
save fifty innocent people from being killed.”9 
In a first example of how this is supposed to work in order to determine 
proportionality, Quong leaves “mode of agency” and “moral status” out of the equation in 
order to simplify things and focuses instead only on harm (the reader can simply replace 
“harm” with “force” to get to Quong’s full account). He explains: 
Suppose Albert is threatening to wrongfully violate Betty’s right against having her 
arm broken. Let’s assume, for simplicity, that having her arm broken causes her 30 
units of harm. … Let’s stipulate that Albert could only permissibly infringe Betty’s 
right if doing so averted more than 120 units of harm to someone else. The harm-
focused stringency of Betty’s right is thus 120 units of harm. Under these 
conditions, it would be proportionate for Betty to impose up to 120 units of harm 
on Albert to avert his wrongful threat. Albert is liable to this amount of defensive 
harm because he is not justified in breaking Betty’s arm unless doing so would 
avert more than 120 units of harm, and thus he has no standing to complain when 
up to 120 units of harm are imposed on him to prevent him from breaking Betty’s 
arm.10 
There are a number of problems with Quong’s account. Imagine the following 
background to Quong’s example. Albert has in the past repeatedly saved Betty’s life, 
risking his own. However, an affliction runs in his family that makes male family 
members prone to attempt to break people’s arms in fits of rage once they get older. 
Betty, in contrast, is normally prone to utterly excessive self-defense but also to keeping 
promises. Given this situation, Albert promises Betty to overcompensate her afterwards if 
he should ever break her arm and asks her, in turn, to promise him not to inflict more than 
30 units of harm on him in case he should ever try to break her arm (he is afraid that their 
friendship otherwise might end, and so, in fact, is Betty). She makes this promise. Thus 
here we have a situation where Albert could (ex exemplo) only inflict up to 30 units of 
harm on Betty “if doing so averted more than 120 units of harm to someone else,” yet 
Albert would not be liable to this amount of harm (120 units): if Betty inflicted this 
amount of harm on Albert to defend her from his unjustified attempt to break her harm, 
she would violate her promise (which under the circumstances seems to be a valid one) 
and thus, correspondingly, Albert’s right that she does not inflict this amount of harm on 
him. Since he does have this right, he is not liable to the amount of harm. Thus, the 
stringency principle is wrong. 
A further problem with Quong’s account is that it relies on a number of arbitrary 
choices. First, it is mysterious why the stringency of Betty’s right against Albert should 
be exclusively measured by how much force Albert would have to avert from “someone 
else”11 through his act of transgressing Betty’s right in order to have a necessity 
justification for transgressing it.12 Quong provides no argument for why he chooses this 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 159. 
10 Ibid., p. 162. 
11 In addition to the example already quoted, see also ibid., p. 166. I have added the 
emphasis. 
12 Some authors use the term “infringement” exclusively to refer to justified 
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particular measuring rod although there are obvious alternatives that suggest themselves 
(but remain unmentioned by Quong). To wit, why not measure the stringency of a right 
by how much compensation (where compensation need not be exclusively monetary) a 
transgressor of the right would owe to the rights-holder (or her dependents)? Or why not 
measure it by what the rights-holder may do to protect her right against a potential rights-
violator? Of course, this latter option would not help to answer the proportionality 
question as it presupposes an answer to it. But by what right can we assume that one can 
gauge the stringency of a right without first considering what amount of force would be 
proportionate for its protection? Quong doesn’t say. 
Moreover, even if we accepted (for no apparent reason) that what determines the 
stringency of a right is exclusively the amount of force that one would have to avert from 
someone in order to have a necessity justification for one’s transgressing the right in 
order to avert said force – why should it be someone else? The suggestion that one should 
assess what an innocent victim could proportionately do to a culpable aggressor by 
measuring what could be done to the victim for the benefit of an innocent person looks 
suspiciously like an attempt to stack the decks against a harsh proportionality criterion. 
Moreover, the principle itself only states, to repeat: “If a wrongful attacker threatens to 
violate a right with stringency level X, then the level of defensive force it is proportionate 
to impose on the attacker is equivalent to X.” But which right is under threat of violation? 
Obviously, Betty’s right against Albert. (Quong himself states that “Betty has a right 
against Albert” imposing certain amounts of force on her,13 and Betty’s rights against 
Albert are not the same as Betty’s rights against, say, Carl. Quong clearly – and wisely – 
accepts such a Hohfeldian relational account of rights.14) But then the stringency of this 
right should be measured by how much force Albert must be able to avert from himself in 
order to have a necessity justification for infringing Betty’s right against him. 
This, however, has the consequence that Quong’s account cannot “explain” – contrary 
to what Quong claims15 – the allegedly intuitive judgment that it would be 
disproportionate to kill Albert in order to keep him from breaking one’s finger. Nor can it 
function as an arbiter between this intuition and an opposing intuition that deems killing 
Albert permissible. A first reason for the suspicion that Quong’s account cannot perform 
these tasks is that it appears to be purely formal. His account says that you may not kill 
Albert to keep him from breaking your finger if your right that your finger not be broken 
is not that stringent as to rule out the permissibility of infringing the right in order to avert 
less than lethal threats from “someone else.” The formality lies in the fact that someone 
who deems killing Albert permissible in defense of the finger could simply deny that the 
right to the integrity of the finger is not that stringent. After all, nowhere does Quong 
provide an argument to show that it isn’t. It is such an independent argument, however, 
                                                                                                                                            
transgressions of rights, while they use the term “violation” exclusively to refer to 
unjustified transgression. I therefore use the term “transgression” here in order to have a 
neutral term. 
13 Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” p. 166. 
14 See, for example, Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong, “Necessity, Moral Liability, 
and Defensive Harm,” Law and Philosophy 31: 673-701, where the use of the Hohfeldian 
framework is particularly clear. 
15 Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” pp. 172-173. 
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that would do the substantive moral work, not Quong’s formal stringency principle. Yet 
while I think that this argument has considerable force against Quong’s account, he could 
point out that his principle might nevertheless fulfill a limited function as arbiter, as 
follows: if someone initially has the intuition that killing Albert in defense of your finger 
is permissible, but has an even stronger intuition that your right that your finger not be 
broken is not that stringent as to rule out the permissibility of infringing the right in order 
to avert less than lethal threats from “someone else,” and has been convinced that the 
stringency principle is correct and should operate with reference to “someone else,” he 
would be forced to give up, or at least to call into question, his initial intuition that killing 
Albert in defense of the finger was justified. 
In reply to this, however, we can turn to the considerations above: Quong has not 
provided any argument as to why, first, the stringency of a right should be measured 
exclusively with reference to permissible rights-infringement; and second, and more 
importantly in the present context, he has not provided any explanation as to why the 
permissibility of the rights-infringement should be established with reference to 
“someone else,” namely with reference to an “innocent person,”16 instead of, far more 
plausibly, with reference to the person against whom the right in question is actually 
being held: the aggressor. If we do that, however, the hard-core self-defender’s 
conversion experience we speculated about at the end of the previous paragraph will 
surely fail to materialize: someone who has the intuition that you can justly (and thus 
without any rights-violation) kill a culpable aggressor in order to keep him from breaking 
your finger will most certainly not simultaneously have the intuition that the very same 
aggressor may rights-infringingly, and only for his own benefit, break your finger in 
order to keep you from killing him. While this would not be a logical contradiction, it 
would certainly not make normative sense. 
Of course, Quong claims that in the “initial comparison, we must gauge the degree of 
defensive force imposed on the attacker as if the attacker retains all his rights, though of 
course if we subsequently determine that some amount of defensive force is 
proportionate, then we will conclude that the attacker does not, in fact, retain rights 
against the imposition of this force,”17 but it remains entirely unclear why we “must” do 
that in the initial phase. Why should one ignore that the aggressor is an aggressor? Given 
that Quong elsewhere (together with the co-author of that article) concerns himself with 
the question of how much force a culpable rapist may use against his victim to defend 
himself, during the rape, from serious but unnecessary force wielded by the rape victim 
against him and accordingly inquires into the amount of defensive force the victim is 
liable to,18 the equivalent question in the present context of stringency should come quite 
naturally to him: what amount of rights-infringing (as opposed to defensive) force may 
the aggressor, during his aggression, inflict on his victim to avert a certain amount of 
force being inflicted on himself? What amount of force he may inflict for the purpose of 
helping someone else, in particular an innocent person, in contrast, can hardly be relevant 
                                                
16 Ibid., p. 159. 
17 Ibid., p. 166. 
18 Firth and Quong, “Necessity, Moral Liability, and Defensive Harm,” p. 699. For a 
discussion, see Uwe Steinhoff, “Firth and Quong on Liability to Defensive Harm: A 
Critique,” manuscript, available at http://philpapers.org/rec/STEFAQ. 
 5 
to determining the stringency of his victim’s right against him, a culpable aggressor, 
whose “moral status” is certainly different from that of an innocent person. That harsh 
force may be inflicted on him might therefore “reflect,” to use Quong’s expression,19 his 
moral status, not violate or “infringe” it.  
Thus, if we accepted Quong’s suggestion that the stringency of a right should be 
measured exclusively with reference to permissible rights-infringement, then the only 
plausible point of reference can be how much force the aggressor would have to be able 
to avert from himself by transgressing the victim’s right in order for this transgression to 
be justified. Consequently, Quong’s “stringency principle” will be unable to adjudicate 
any substantive questions about proportionality in self-defense. The divergent intuitions 
harsh defenders and lenient defenders will input into the apparatus of “the stringency 
principle” in order to calculate the stringency of the victim’s right against the defender 
will simply reflect the diverging intuitions they already have with regard to what is and 
what is not proportionate in the victim’s defense against the aggressor. It seems the whole 
enterprise is circular, or at the very least pointless.  
Finally, not only has Quong not provided any argument as to why we should measure 
the stringency of a right exclusively with reference to permissible rights-infringement, he 
has also not provided any argument as to why we should measure proportionality with 
exclusive reference to the stringency of a right. To be sure, he criticizes an alternative 
account, namely “the responsibility principle,” and while I find Quong’s criticism 
plausible, “the responsibility principle” is most certainly not the only and not even the 
most important alternative account of proportionality,20 and thus it would be somewhat 
hasty to think that Quong’s account wins out by default, as it were, once “the 
responsibility principle” has been refuted. Quong might also think that his account does 
not need any further supporting argument if it meets certain conditions that according to 
him “a successful account of proportionality” should satisfy and, also according to him, 
his account does satisfy.21 Unfortunately, one of these conditions (number 4) simply 
presupposes an intimate connection between liability and proportionality and thus begs 
the question against accounts that deny such an intimate connection; another condition 
asks that a successful account be able to explain our intuitive judgments in paradigm 
cases (and I just argued that Quong’s account does not have any explanatory power at 
all); and the other two conditions basically ask the account to get the considerations that 
play a role in proportionality right and to unify them under one rationale. 
However, by providing an account that assesses proportionality with exclusive 
reference to the stringency of a right he does not get the considerations that play a role 
right. To wit, Quong states – correctly, in my view – that a fully culpable mugger and a 
partially excused mugger (excused due to “some mild coercion by others”) “violate the 
                                                
19 Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” p. 159. 
20 Quong claims that this account is “very widely accepted,” see ibid., p. 145. In fact, 
however, this account is only accepted (and not even there universally) among a small 
group of philosophers who usually describe themselves as “revisionary just war 
theorists.” Other philosophers are less enthusiastic, and in the legal discussion the 
account in question is practically irrelevant. 
21 Ibid, pp. 149 and 172-173. 
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same type of right with the same stringency.”22 I do not see why this should change if the 
mugger is fully excused due to sufficiently harsh coercion. (Maybe Quong would suggest 
that the “mode of agency” is different. But why, if it isn’t different in the first two cases? 
The mode of agency seems to be the same: it is the mugging mode.) The victim’s right is 
the same and has the same stringency in all three cases. Yet it seems intuitively plausible 
– at least it is an intuition shared by most Western legal systems – that proportionality 
requires more leniency and less harshness in one’s defense against fully excused 
aggressors than in one’s defense against culpable ones.23 Quong’s account cannot explain 
this.  
I conclude that Quong’s account of proportionality in self-defense is inadequate. 
Moreover, nothing in his account offers any reason in support of the view that one must 
not kill in defense of property or in order to avoid minor injuries.  
                                                
22 Ibid., p. 169. 
23 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, p. 865; Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal 
Law, pp. 56 and 192-202; Volker Erb, “Notwehr,” in Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus 
Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, Vol. 1 (Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 2003), pp. 1249-1337, at 1321-1322. 
